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INDEX TO POINTS IN ARGUMENT 
Point No. 1. The Court erred in refusing defend-
ant's requested instruction No. 1 requesting said Court 
to instruct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty 
for the following reasons: 
(a) There is no evidence to show that the intox-
ication of the defendant, assuming it to be proved, or 
the speed of defendant's car, assuming it to be proved, 
or any other careless or reckless act of defendant, 
assuming their proof, was the cause of the death of 
l\{r. Allen, and there is no evidence to show the causal 
connection between any unlawful or negligent act of 
defendant causing said death ------------------------------------ 6-13 
Point No. 2. The Court erred in refusing to give 
defendant's requested instruction No. 12 which reads: 
If you find that Mr. Allen was negligent in crossing 
the highway so that he could not cross with reasonable 
safety in front of defendant's automobile, then his acts 
were the sole proximate cause of his death and the 
defendant must be acquitted ------------------------------------ 13-14 
Point No. 3. The Court erred in refusing to give 
defendant's requested instruction No. 4, which reads: 
Whether your verdict shall be guilty or not guilty 
is for you to determine, but if, after considering the 
evidence, you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the. injuries suffered by Ruben Allen were due to 
grossly negligent, wanton and reckless acts of the de-
fendant in operating his car, your verdict should be 
guilty. If. however, you believe that the defendant was 
operating his car while under the influence of liquor, 
but was then exercising due and proper care and caution, 
and was therefore, not guilty of grossly negligent, wan-
ton, or reckless acts proximately causing injury to the 
deceased and his death, your verdict should be not 
gtlil ty. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 14 
Point No. 4. The Court erred in refusing to· give 
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You are instructed, gentle1nen of the jury, that the de-
fendant had a right to assume that a person upon the 
higlnvay 'vould exercise ordinary care, and that they 
\vould not negligently expose thernselves to danger, and 
that they 'vould exercise ordinary care to ascertain 
the approach of 1notor vehicles, and before you hold 
that the defendant \vas negligent in this case, you must 
take into consideration these assun1ptions 'vhich the 
def~ndant had right to rely on. --.. --:·--------------------~------ 14-15 
Point No. 5. The Court erred in given instruction 
X o. 10 and 'vhich reads: If you find that Mr. Allen was 
negligent in crossing the highway so that he could not 
cross \Yith reasonable safety, in front of defendant's 
auton1obile, and that ~Ir. Read \vas not negligent in 
any "~ay, then nir . ..~..t\..llen 's negligence becomes the sole 
proximate cause of his death- and the defendant should 
he acquitted. _____ _____ _______ _ __ __ ___ ____ __ __ __ __ _ _ __ ____ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 15-16 
Point No. 6. The Court erred in denying defend-
ant's 1notion for arrest of judgment on the ground that 
there y,~as no offense proved in the cause. ______________ 16-17 
Point No. 7· The Court erred in refusing to give 
defendant's part of requested instruction No. 1% and 
\vhich reads as follo,vs: 
"You are instructed in this conection, however, that 
the Inere fact that you believe from the evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an 
unlawful act not amounting to a felony, and that \Vhile 
committing such unlawful act, the defendant caused 
the death of a living human being, such is not sufficient 
to _sustain a charge of manslaughter. There must be 
in addition, a causal connection bet\veen the unlavvful 
aet and death. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 17-18 
Point No. 8. The Court erred in refusing the de-
fendant's request not to submit said cause to the jury 
, at all on the grounds that there is no evidence said 
1\.llen died because of said collision. ---------------------------- 18 
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Point No. 9. The Court erred in permitting testi-
Inony and exhibit ''A'' to be introduced as to automobile 
skid marks. 
(a) that there was no testimony or evidence which 
showed said purported skid marks were made by de-
fendant's automobile that he was driving at time of 
accident. . .... -------------------- ___ -------------------.. -----.--------------------- 18-20 
Point No. 10. The Court erred in permitting one 
Ronald Hadfield to give testimony as to the speed of 
defendant's car or any car at the time of accident or 
immediately thereafter from length of skid marks for 
the following reasons and to which defendant duly ex-
cepted: 
(a) There was no evidence to show defendant made 
such skid marks. 
(b) There was no evidence to show the number of 
skid marks made. 
(c) There was no testimony on voir dire or other-
wise to show that said Hadfield was qualified to com-
pute the speed of a car from the skid marks made· __ 18-20 
Point No. 11. The Court erred in submitting to 
the jury subparagraphs 3, 4 and 5 of instruction No. 2, 
which were in the form of questions and to which de-
fendant duly accepted -------------------------------------------------- 18-20 
(3) At the time of the accident, was the defendant 
operating his car at a speed of about fifty miles per 
hour while he was then under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor and without keeping any lookout as to 
where he was going, and without having said automoible 
under control' 
( 4) Did such acts, if any, on the part of said de-
fendant, constitute criminal negligence' 
( 5) Was said criminal negligence, if any you find, 
the proximate cause of the accident and resulting death? 
Point No. 12. The Court erred in denying defend-
ant's motion for a new trial -------------------------------------- 20-21 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
State of l; tah 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
-vs-
Budd Jay Read, 
Defendant and .. A.ppellant. 
I 
) 
APELLANT'S 
BRIEF 
Case No. 
883 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This was an action against the defendant, Budd Jay 
Read, charging him with the commission of the crime 
of involuntary manslaughter on the 6th day of Septem-
ber A.D. 1951 in Cache County, State of Utah in "\vords 
as follo,vs: 
That on the 6th day of September, A. D. 1951, at 
Cache County, State of Utah, the said defendant did 
then and there unlawfully and "vithout malice kill Ruben 
F. Allen contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the 
State aforesaid, in such cases made and provided, and 
against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
Subsequent to the filing of the information, a bill 
of particulars "vas supplied upon demand (9)· 
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2 
.t\ preliminary hearing \Vas had before the City 
(jonrt on the 19th day of Septen1ber A. D. 1951, and 
tlH~ defendant \Vas bound over to the District Court for 
trial. 
rrhe case was tried before the Court sitting with a 
jury on the 8th and 9th of October, A. D. 1951. At the 
conclusion of the trial the defendant requested the Court 
by \Y ritten request to instruct the jury to return a ver-
dict of not guilty which was refused by the Court (17). 
The ju1·~r \vas instructed, arguments made and the de-
fendant found guilty as charged (31). 
A n1otion for a new trial (32) was filed by the de-
fendant and the same was heard and denied on the 18th 
day of October, _.A_. D. 1951 by the said Court and on 
the san1e day defendant \vas ~entenced by the Court 
(Tr. 227-228). Notice of appeal \Vas then served and 
filed by the defendant. ( Tr. 34). 
rrhc• evidence shows by the plaintiff's 0\Vn ·wit-
nesses, ,\~ho sa\Y the accident, that at about the hour 
of 5 P·~L on Septe1nber 6th, A. D. 1951, as· the defendant 
\vas proceding in a northerly direction bet,veen 5th and 
6th North, on Main Street, Logan, Utah and on the east 
side of the said street, Rueben F. Allen ean1e acros~ 
said ~fain Street on a bicycle and inter.cepted the de-
fendant's vehicle on the east side of said street and in 
about the middle of the block (Tr. 45-46) according to 
Ingrid Bjorkman, the State's first eye witness. That 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Allen appeared to look to neither right nor left as he 
caine aeross the street fro1n the \vest but \Vas lookip.g 
8traight ahead ( Tr. 185) \Yhich \vould be in a easterly 
direction. ~-\ccording to the State's second eye witness 
to the fatal aeident, a one ~Ir. Clark,- who \vas standing 
on the east side of said street and \Vithin a few feet 
froin place of accident, )[r. Allen started fro1n the west 
side of the road and caine across in a southeasterly 
direction on his wheel ( 15-!, 155, 159), and said Allen 
appeared to be looking in the direction he "\vas going. 
That it further appears from said Clark's testimony 
that he observed both defendant and deceased about the 
san1e time and \vhich placed Allen near curb on "\vest 
side of street and defendant about lj2 block south of 
the plaee of accident. It should be further· mentioned 
in regards to the State's first witness, Mrs. Bjorkman, 
that she ,, .. as coming out of a driveway in her car 
just north of a Safeway store, which is situated in 
about the middle of block running between 5th and 6th 
North on ~fain Street and on east side thereof and ob-
serving defendant coming about lf2 block to her south, 
stopped her car at the curb line to await defendant's 
passing (Tr. 43, 44, 45). That she, as well as Mr. Clark, 
was on the east side of said street when she stopped her 
car (Tr. 43). That the body was carried on fender of 
defendant's car and rolled off in front of her car (Tr. 
46). 
The Court permitted a map to be introduced which 
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4 
purported to show part of the street block in question and 
which further purported to show skid marks over the 
objection of defendant (Tr. 42) until a proper founda-
tion had ben laid and as showing they were skid marks 
1nade by defendant's car (Tr. 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25) and 
that only two skid marks were shown (Tr. 20). The 
defense further objected to State's witness Tolman test-
ifying as to rneasurements of purported skid marks 
from a 1nemorandum taken from an original memoran-
dum at scene of accident and not from his recollection 
the original not being in Court but was overruled (Tr. 
28). That we further objected to testimony of Mrs. 
Bjorkman as to skid marks, no foundation having been 
laid but "\Vere overruled (Tr. 48) and she couldn't say 
skid marks were those of defendant's car (Tr. 62). We 
further objected to Captain Hadfield testifying as to 
skid marks as no proper foundation had been laid as 
showing they were defendant's but were overruled by 
the Court (Tr. 122, 123, 126, 127). We further objected 
to the Court allowing said officer Hadfield to testify as 
to the speed of defendant's car from the skid marks 
purportedly 1nade by his car right after the accident 
because said Hadfield could not say as to whether there 
were 1, 2, 3 or 4 skid marks made and of course not 
being able to say no proper foundation was laid as it is 
conceded by sajd Hadfield that the less skid marks the 
longer they will be under the sarne speed and conditions 
(Tr. 137, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147) nor that said Hadfield 
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had ~ho\vn hilu~elf to be an expert in co1nputing speed 
fro1n length of skid Inarks (Tr. 149)· 
There "'-as evidence sub1nitted by one witness, that 
in hi~ opinion the defendant \vas intoxicated. (Tr. 79). 
The defendant testified that he had had a bottle of beer 
and a glass of beer. (Tr. 190). The defendant test-
ified a~ to the accident thus: '' ~-\., \Veil, when I got to 
Safe,vays I see a car con1ing out of the parking lot, 
and it \\Tas not coming fast, but it \Vas still 1noving. 
and I watched to see if that \Vas going to continue coin-
ing. I had my foot over the brake at the time, and 
when the car came to a stop I continued on, and at that 
. time \Vas about \vhen accident hapened, I just looked 
straight ahead again, and I couldn't avoid missing 
hi cycle (Tr. 191 ). '' Deceased \Vas at ;.that time about 6 
feet in front of defendant (191) and that before he sa\v 
il:Irs. Bjorlanan coming out of driveway to north of 
Safeway store he was looking to right as there were 
two drive\vays south of said Safeway store (210). There 
\vas absolutely no testimony to the contrary to Mr. 
Reid's as to \vhat he was doing just prior to the accident. 
Further that he was not going over 25 miles an hour (Tr. 
191) \Vhich was the same speed as testified to by Mrs· 
Bjorkman, the State's witness (Tr. 60) she would not 
say under oath that defendant was going faster than 
25 miles per hour. 
POINTS OF ERROR 
Appellant relies upon the points of error stated 
in "Index of Points in Argument" and will not there-
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fore repeat them here, but proceed with argument in 
support of said points. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 1 
We are of the opinion that the Court below erred 
when it refused defendant's request to instruct the jury 
to bring in a verdict of not guilty ( pp. 17) for the reas-
ons that there is a complete lack of evidence to show a 
causal connection between the alleged purported act or 
acts of the defendant and the death of Mr. Allen. In 
the bill of particulars filed in response to demand by 
defendant· it sets forth the following: ''That at said 
time and place, the defendant was driving said automo-
bile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
in a ·careless, reckless, and unlawful manner, and with-
~ut du·e caution and circumspection.'' And that he drove 
''his automobile into and against a bicycle upon which 
Reuben F. Allen, deceased, was then and there riding 
and operating across said .Main Street from west side 
to the east side thereof" and that said collision occurred 
in the east portion of said highway, and that -. said 
Reuben F. Allen, deceased, was thrown from his bi-
cycle onto said highway causing almost, if not, instan-
tanious death.'' The judge submitted the cause to the 
jury on these charges of criminal negligence. A dis-
cussion of the question of causal connecting between 
the death of Mr. Allen and any alleged act or a lawful 
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7 
act done in a crilninal u1anner bv defendant is therefore 
' • w ' . 
neeessnry. 
Have ,,.e in this eanse such criJ.ninal negligence and 
proxin1ate cause ns is required by la",'" for a conviction of 
1nanslaughter J ,,~ e believe not· We believe this court 
is too fa1niliar \Yith the cases of State v.· L1ngman, 
97 lltah 180, 91 Pae. 2nd -±57 (1939) as also the case 
of State v. Busby 102 Utah 416, 131 Pac (2)510 (1942) 
together 'vith the case of State v. Capps 176 P. (2)873 
and the opinions written in connection there,vith to want 
any extended discussion on ·proximate cause in these 
cases. l;nder the opinion in State vs. Olsen, Utah, 160 
Pac. (2) 427 (1945) nir. Justice Wolfe stated at page 
429: t~nder the holding of State v. Lingman, 97 Ut. 
180, 91 Pae. 2d 457, the State is required in a case such 
as this to prove that the defendant was driving in 
marked disregard for safety of others. A mere show-
ing that the _driver of an automobile w~nt to sleep at 
the wheel will not by itself sho'v a marked disregard. 
In State v. Thatcher, Utah 157 P. {2) 258 (1945) it 
seems that in that 1natter Thatcher was drivir;tg at an 
excessive rate of speed in Oren City, when he ran into 
some people walking along the shoulder of the high,vay 
on the west side. Two of the walkers were killed. Com-
menting on that cause the Court said at page 261: 
''Although the evidence may not have been 
sufficient to have proven that defendant was tra-
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veling as fast as 60 miles per hour as testified to 
by the patrolman, nevertheless, after a careful 
examination of the record, 've co~clude, that the 
jury could have found from their testimony that 
defendant was exceeding the speed limit and that 
said speeding was a proximate cause of the ac-
cident. Had defendant been traveling within the 
speed limit he would have seen the pedestrians 
within range of the car's headlights for a longer 
period of time, and this fact would have given 
him a better opportunity to have seen the pedes-
rians and then turn slightly to the left, thereby 
avoiding the collision. 
The fact that there was a group of five 
people, three girls wearing light clothing, and two 
soldiers in summer uniforms walking on the 
shoulder of the road but near the west edge of 
the cement portion of the highway in the same 
direction as the defendant's car was traveling 
and that this group maintained the same relative 
position on the shoulder of the highway as de-
fendant aproached and that he veered to the 
right and drove directly into them, would, in our 
opinion, be sufficient evidence to justify the jury 
in finding that defendant failed to keep a suf-
ficient lookout to discover their presence in time 
to avoid a collision with them.'' 
In the instant case as this Court vvill have observed, 
Mr· Allen was coming from west in a southeasterly di-
rection, in the middle of the block, and, intercepted the 
defendant who \vas on his side of the street and watch-
ing for any traffic that Inight issue from any of the 
four ( 4) lanes on the east side of 1fain Street near the 
Safe,vay store. That he did see Mrs. Bjorlm1an com-
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ing in a ""esterly direetion out of a lane on north side 
of said store and sn\Y her ~top her vehicle at the eurb 
and being satisfied that she \vould proceed no further 
looked ahead and it was not until then that he saw J\fr. 
Allen a fe\Y feet in front of his car \vhich gave him 
neither tiine nor space to do anything about it. That 
~Ir .. A.llen \Yas in a place of danger is Inanifest. But 
it is also conclusive that :J[r. Read had no reason to be-
lieve or asslune that anyone \Vould be cutting in front 
of hun in the Iniddle of the block and that being the 
case \Ye cannot see that any negligence on his part could 
be said to be the proximate cause. And. too, even if 
he had seen .. Allen coming across the street in a south-
easterly direction he nor anyone else would reasonably 
think that .. Allen 'vould not stop or turn directly south 
on the \Vest side of the street and not endanger himself 
hy trying to cut in front of defendant. Again, let us 
asslune that instead of keeping an eye to. the right for 
traffic that might be coming out of said lanes or for 
cars that might be backing up from the curb on the 
east side of said I\Iain Street, that he had kept \vatch 
as to Mr. Allen anticipating that he might do what he 
actually did do and 1frs. Bjorkman or someone else 
would have come out of one of said lanes and a collision 
had taken place causing death. Would the prosecution 
hold him for manslaughter~ 
In 99 A.L.R· 772 in an annotation on homicidal as-
sault in regard with the negligent driving of a car or its 
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10 
use for unlawful purpose or violation of law, it is thus 
stated: 
''In order that a person may be guilty of a 
criminal homicide arising from the negligent op-
eration of an automobile or its use for an unlaw-
ful purpose or in violation of law, it is uniformly 
held that it must be shown that such negligent 
operation, or use for an unlawful purpose or in 
violation of law, was the direct and proximate 
cause of the death; that is, that there was present 
a casual connection between the act and the 
death.'' 
In Jackson vs. State, 101 Ohio 152, 127 NE 870, 
(1920) the Ohio Supreme Court said: 
"It will ·be observed that the charge above 
quoted warranted the jury in fi~ding the plain-
, tiff in error, Van Jackson, guilty of manslaught-
er, if they should find that he, while operating 
his automobile at a greater rate of speed than 
15 miles per hour, struck and killed the de~edent 
irrespective of whether the rate of speed was 
the proximate cause of the killing; and, since this 
proposition of law was in no way modified by the 
general charge, the square question is raised here 
as to whether an accidental, unintentional kill-
ing of a person by another engaged in an un-
lawful act makes that person guilty · of man-
slaughter under the statute, irrespective of any 
connection between the unlawful act and the un-
intentional killing, and it seems to this court that 
an analysis of the illogical and absurd results 
which would necessarily follow the recognition 
of such a rule will answer the query.,., 
In Chandler vs. State, Oklahoma, 146 Pac. 2nd 598 
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(1944) the court stated at page 603: 
'~we are a"'"are of the "rell recognized· rule 
of law in civil cases that the question of prox-
imate cause is generally a question for the jury· 
This rule of law also has application in criminal 
cases. But there must be evidence of its appli-
cation. In crilninal cases, it has been universal-
ly held that speed alone, even though it be in 
contravention of a statute, may not cause one 
to be guilty of a crime. 
It has been universally held that a person 
may be found guilty of criminal homicide aris-
ing from negligent operation of an automobile 
or its use for an unlawful purpose, or in viola-
tion of law, but it is uniformly held that it must. 
be shown that such negligent operation, or use 
for an unlawful purpose or in violation of law, 
was the direct and proximate cause of the death; 
that is, that there was a causal connection be-
tween the act and the death." (citations) 
In O'Mally vs. Eagan, 43 Wyoming 233, 2 Pac. 2nd 
1063, 1066, the court stated : 
"In the case at bar there is no direct test-
inlony; if defendant's negligence was in fact the 
proximate cause of the injury, it must be gath-
ered from the circumstances shown herein. Now 
speed or any other alleged negligent act of the 
defendant cannot, of course, be said to have been 
the proximate cause, unless the accident could 
have been avoided in the absence thereof. And 
counsel for the plaintiff ought to be able to point 
out, by analyzing the circumstances shown by the 
evidence, how the defendant would have been able 
to avoid the collision, had he been in the exercise 
of reasonable care.· But counsel have wholly 
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failed to do so, though they have .. repeatedly as-
serted that the jury might have rightly found that 
the defendant's neglience contributed to the in-
jury in this case.'' 
In J:>c~or)le vs. Young, California, 129 ·Pac. 2nd, 353 
(1942) the eonrt stated at page 356: 
''The driver of a vehicle overtaking a street 
ear, stopped or about to stop for the purpose 
of discharging passengers where there is no safe-
ty zone is required to stop vehicle at the rear 
of the street car and there remain until any per-
sons alighting have reached a place of safety. 
Vehicle Code, 571. Assu1ning defendant violated 
that rule, the mere violation thereof under the 
circumstances did not constitute wilful miscon-
duct or reckless disregard of, or wilful indiffer-
ence to the safety of others. She testified that 
she did not see the decedent until he stepped 
from the street car onto her fender. The people's 
witnesses stated that deceased had stepped down 
and commenced to take the next step forward 
'vhen he was struck. This is not a case where 
defendant had an opportunity to see the deceased 
for son1e distance, but still continued on her 
course thus showing an element of intent to cause 
injury or a high degree of probability thereof. 
The judgment is reversed.'' 
In People vs. Townsend, Mich. 183 NW 177, (1921) 
179, the court stated: 
''It is gross inculpable negltgence for a 
drunken man to guide and operate an automobile 
upon a public highway, and one doing so and 
occasioning injuries to another, causing death, is 
guilty of manslaughter· It was unlawful for the 
plaintiff to operate his automobile upon the pub-
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lie high"~ay while he 'vas intoxicated; made un-
lawful by statute, and wrong in and of itself, 
1nanslaughter provided the death of Agnes 
Thorne 'vas a proxin1ate result of his unlawful 
act.'' 
In Dunvill vs. State, Ind., 123 NE, ( 1919) the court 
stated at page 689 : 
''It is also true that, if he is acting in viola-
tion of a positive statute under circumstances 
that sho'v a reckless disregard for the life and 
limb of others, and this violation is the proximate 
cause of the death, the law then implies an intent 
to do the injury and makes him guilty of invol-
untary manslaughter. Whether the unlawful act 
committed is the one which we have first above 
indicated, or the second one pointed out, it is 
always necessary that the evidence shows that the 
unlawful act is the proximate cause ~f the 
death". 
r\.RG U~!ENT 
Point No. 2 
In eonnection with the subject of proximate cause 
but as also foru1ing a separate point of error (assign-
lnent of error No. 2) con1plained of, the defendant 
requested the court to charge: "If you find that Mr . 
..:\lien was negligent in crossing the highway so that he 
could not cross with reasonable safety in front of de-
fendant's auto1nobile, then his acts were the sole prox-
inlate cause of his death and defendant must be acquit-
ted.'' ( pp. 23) This request was refused. We believe 
this request states this court vie'v as expressed in Ceder-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
loff vs. Whited 169 P (2nd) 777. In the instant case 
~~ r. 1\llen placed himself in a hazardous part of the 
street and where ordinarily a driver would not look for 
a person. If Mr. Allen had been crossing at a marked 
cross-,valk either in the 1niddle of the block or at an 
intersection then Mr. Read might be charged with be-
ing the proxin1ate cause of his death but not so in the 
rniddle of the block where there 'vas no cross-walk and 
\vhere :\lr· Read was looking to his right where he might 
expect either cars backing up from the east curb or cars 
issuing fro1n one or all said four ( 4) lanes near Safeway 
~tore. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 3 
We respectfully urge that the court belo'v erred in 
failing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 4 
in the form requested. (pp. 19) We shall not repeat the 
requested instruction but refer this Court to our index 
where it is fully stated. And 've further urge that 'this 
requested instruction states the law correctly and is well 
bottomed. See State vs. Ha1nberg 143 A. 47, 99 A.L.R. 
841 which case in our opinion approves of said instruc-
tion in the form requested. We believe further that this 
refusal constitutes prejudicial error. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 4 
We also respectfully urge that the court below was 
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in error in refusing to give defendant's ·requested in-
struction No· 10 (pp. 22) '\Yhich reads: Yon are instruct-
ed gentlemen of the jury that the defendant had a right 
to asswue that a person upon the high,vay 'vould exer-
cise ordinary care, and that they would not negligently 
expose the1nselves to danger, and that they would ex-
ercise ordinary c.are to ascertain the approach of motor 
vehicles, and before you hold the defendant 'vas negli-
gent in this case, you n1ust take into consideration these 
assumptions which defendant had a right to rely on. 
The Court below makes a notation on the requested 
instruction that it was given in substance but we fail 
to find it suficiently covered in any instruction given by 
the Court. We believe the failure to give said requested 
instruction is prejudicial eror for the same has been 
held to be a most proper one in Hay vs. Fornich 250 
I->. 565. We can see no good reason why the defendant 
should not have had the benefit of this instruction as 
pointed out such instruction 'vas held to be a proper 
one in the case cited. In refusing said instruction the 
jury presumably assumed that it was criminal negli-
gence for· said defendants to assume that Mr. Allen 
would act as a reasonable prudent person "\vould under 
the circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 5 
The Court gave the following instruction, instruc-
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ti?n No. 10 pp. 26 which \Ve will repeat: If you find 
that Mr. Allen was negligent in crossing the highway 
so that he could not cross with reasonable safety in 
front of defendant's autornobile, and that Mr. Reed was 
not negligent in any vvray, then Mr. Allen's negligence 
becon1es the sole proximate cause of his death and 
the defendant should be acquitted, and to which instruc-
tion defendant duly excepted ( tr. 225). 
In this instruction the Court below says In effect 
that though Mr. Allen was negligent in crossing in 
front of defendant's car and he could not do so with 
reasonable safety, said Allen \vould be the proximate 
cause of his death, provided, however, that Mr. Read 
\Vas not negligent in any way. In other \vords if Read 
'vas negligent in any way, though such negligence was 
not, the proximate cause of or contributed to the cause 
of Allen's death he was still guilty of manslaughter. 
We do not believe such is the law, there must of neces-
sity be a proximate cause e1nanating from said neg-
ligence and which we have discussed in point No. 1 and 
'vill therefore not repeat. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 6 
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
arrest of judgment. (Tr. 223). In this motion, made in 
open court and after motion for a new trial was denied, 
\Ve held then and do no'v that there was no offense 
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proved in the cause against ~fr. Read. This contention 
of course is based upon the fact that there was no caus-
al connection bet,veen the death of ~Ir. Allen and any 
recklessness or negligence of ~[r. Read. In other words 
Mr. Read's negligence or recklessness, if any, \Vas not 
the proximate cause of ~Jr. Allen's death as urged in 
our argument in point 1. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 7 
We believe the Court belo\v erred in not giving de-
fendant's requested instruction in full denominated by 
the figures 1Y2 pp. 16. We will not here repeat the 
instruction as it is stated in the index under point 7. 
That part which the court refused to give reads as 
follows : ''You are instructed in this connection, how-
ever, that the mere fact that you may believe from the 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defndant 
committed an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, 
and while committing such unlawful act, the defendant 
caused the death of a human being, such is not sufficient 
to sustain a charge of manslaughter. There must be in 
addition, a causal connection between the commission of 
the unlawful act and death." 
If this part of the instructions had been given it 
seerningly would have caused the jury to pause and con-
sider what ''causal connection'' really means and that 
such is not to be assumed because death resulted while 
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defendant 'vas in the commission of an unlawful act. The 
whole instruction is taken from People vs. Black, 295 
P. 87, and in our opinion is a most proper instruction. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 8 
rrhe Court was further requested not to submit the 
cause to the jury at the close of the evidence on the 
ground that there was no evidence to show that the col-
lision caused the death of ~fr. Allen. (tr· 224) , This 
Court will search the. record in vai:p for any testimony 
that said Allen died from any injuries he received from 
said collision. If we are right on this matter it 'vould 
~~een1 to follo'v that the Court should have dismissed the 
cause. In Abbott on Facts,_ Fifth Edition at page 360 
the text reads: ''Likewise, where death is instantaneous, 
the plaintiff must show that it resulted from the app!ica-
tion of the force in question.'' In support of the text 
it cites Fonzone vs. Lehigh Valley Transit Co. 318 Pa. 
514, 178 A 671 - the note reads : ''One suing for the 
death of a person struck by a street car must prove that 
death resulted from the contact of the street car with 
the deceased body, as there is no presumption that the 
deceased 'vas alive just before being struck." This 
seemingly being the la'v the cause should never have 
been submittd. 
ARGUMENT 
Points No. 9, 10, 11 
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'Vas the Court in error "-rhen it perinittPd testhnony 
and exhibit ',; r\ ~. showing Bkid Inark~~ ( rPr. 1fl~ 17' 18, 
19, 20, 23, ·122, 123, 126, 127) and 2, in pern1itting one 
Ronald Hadfield to te~tif~· n~ an expert in eoutputin;~~· 
speed of car front length of skid nulrkB and partienlarl)·· 
\\?hen said Hadfield or any other v.·i tness could not sa~· 
the number of· skid n1arks such computation \vas taken 
fronl" (tr. 137, 141. 142. 143, 145, 147) 
In our state1nent of facts \Ve have referred to the 
testi1nony on these 1natters and \vherein in the transcript 
it Inay be found but repeat it here although perhaps un-
1H_\ee~~ary. '': e believe there \vas no testin1ony to sho\v 
that the skid 1narks in question \Vere made by defendant 
for it 1nust be noted that ~Irs. Bjorkman, an eye \vitness 
for the plaintiff, could not say that the skid marks 
\Vere the defendant's (tr. 62) nor is there any evidence 
\vhich showed by tread of tires or otherwise that said 
1narks were made by any tires on defendant's automo-
bile. Nor is there any testi1nony which shows how many 
skid Inarks were made. If we are correct in these · 
state1nents or any of the statements of course it must 
be conceded the said testimony as to all or any of these 
rnatters was inadmissable for the purpose they were 
or any of them were received and therefore prejudical 
error. And the testimony of said Hadfield was errone-
ously adn1itted. So much for points 9 and 10. 
In regard to point No. 11, we took exception to the 
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questions put to the jury by the Court as to sub-para-
graph 3, 4 and 5 of said instruction No. 2. We are 
of the opinion that there 'vas no proper evidence intro-
duced showing or tending to show that defendant was 
operating his car at or anywhere near 50 miles per 
hour. Nor 'vas there any evidence to show that he was 
not keeping a proper lookout nor having his car under 
proper control. To substantiate these statements this 
Court may merely reflect on our statement of facts and 
eonsul t the references in the transcript as to this and 
therefore we will not repeat. 
In regards to submitting question No. 5 under in-
struction No· 2 as to whether certain facts as to pur-
ported criminal negligence being ''the proximate cause 
of the accident and resulting death." We believe this 
is sufficiently discussed under point No. 1 and will not 
repeat. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 12 
Point No. 12 concerns itself with the refusal of the 
Court below in granting a new trial. In this we be-
lieve the Court erred for the reasons stated heretofore 
in support of errors No. 1 to 11 inclusive. We are of the 
opinion that the Court should have set the verdict aside 
and passed no judgment on the defendant on the ground 
that there were no facts showing that whatever defend-
ant may have been guilty of did not constitute the prox-
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in1ate cause of said collision and death. In fact the 
Court should have instructed the jury as 've requested 
to bring in a verdict of not guilty. The Courts failurP 
to do so alone and by itself constitutes reversable error. 
We therefore submit that the judgment should be re-
versed, and the action dis1nissed, or at any event, a 
ne'v trial ·be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Harvey A. Sjostrom 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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